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It has been over a hundred years since the 
events examined in Revolution Goes East: 
Imperial Japan and Soviet Communism, by 
Tatiana Linkhoeva, started to unfold, but, as 
the depressingly common refrain teaches us, it 
is still a source for reflection of our 
contemporary times. Just as in the 1920s, anti-
communist discourse, the vilification of 
revolution, and the imposition of conservative 
policies have recently seen a rampant growth. 
Moreover, the flame of infighting within the 
Left keeps burning all too bright, hampering at 
every corner efforts to build a united front or, 
at least, a pragmatic alliance. Part of the 
reasons behind the incompatibility probably 
remains on incomplete explanations of this 
acrimony. The reasons why the Left is so 
divided has been a topic explored over and 
over again. We nevertheless still fail to 
properly understand the nuances of this 
circumstance.The present book is a worthy 
addition to this debate, with fresh ideas and 
approaches to the study of peace and conflicts. 
It provides an insight into how situations of 
confrontation and partisanism, like ideological 
divisions attributed to the rise of political 
socialism, are never as clear-cut as previous 
scholarship claim to be. Although incomplete 
(as no single work can aspire to such feat), this 
book may help readers think twice about 
previous ideas on where it all tends to go 
wrong.  
This is a book detailing the impact of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 in Japan during 
the 1920s. Linkhoeva explores the knotty 
rhizome of reactions to the consecration of the 
new Soviet state and how the richness and 
plurality of debates that it sparked developed 
into fewer and more partisan positions 
throughout the decade. On the one hand, she 
studies the development of official positions 
within the Japanese government, from open 
confrontation to pragmatic recognition. On the 
other, Linkhoeva describes the rich tapestry of 
complex, mutually confronted, and sometimes 
contradictive stances of Japanese left-wing 
intellectuals, politicians, and activists from 
1917 onwards. Their attitudes were determined 
by the deeply entrenched and eventually fatal 
debate – also happening in many different 
territories at the same time – over whether 
progressive forces should focus on national 
mobilization and pushing domestic agendas or 
whether they should be working instead 
towards an international revolution that would 
topple down capitalism and the old order 
simultaneously across the world. As Linkhoeva 
suggests, the fascinating aspect of this debate is 
seeing how the precedent of the Russian 
Revolution acted as a point of reference for the 
two positions. This precedent was framed 
either as a source of emulation or as a 
cautionary tale for the way the Soviet state 
came to be in the following years.  
Tatiana Linkhoeva is at the moment of 
writing an assistant professor in modern Japan 
at New York University. Besides this book, she 
has also worked on the way the Japanese Left 
of the interwar period discussed the Chinese 
Revolution. Her next project is a comparative 
study between Soviet and Japanese ideas of 
empire and how they applied policies to 
Mongolian territories. The author makes a 
commendable work in fighting back common 
misconceptions, especially among Western 
scholars, on the rise of anti-communism in 
Japan and the collapse of the Japanese Left in 
the 1930s. According to Linkhoeva, many of 
these misunderstandings are based on a limited 
grasp of the reasons motivating the different 
social agents engaging with these matters (the 
government, conservative groups, left-wing 
factions…). She defends that their positions 
were more motivated by pragmatism and 
geopolitical needs than what previous scholars 
have argued, too reliant sometimes on purely 
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ideological disagreements. Instead, the author 
concludes that anti-communist sentiment, 
despite all the fanfare, had little impact on the 
way Japan conducted its foreign policy, a 
practical strategy that had small qualms in 
dealing with antagonistic powers like the 
Soviet Union if that helped advance its own 
agenda. Linkhoeva also claims the relevance of 
taking into account the advances of 
revolutionary thought and action in the rest of 
East Asia (particularly in Korea, China, and the 
Mongolian territory) as an essential factor that 
was shaping Japanese intellectual thought and 
the state’s political decisions. In the end, this 
book tries to combine a wide-ranging, great 
scale overlook of interactions across borders 
through meticulous historical study, most of the 
time using the life of significant individuals as 
conduits for her arguments. Besides this 
aspirations for the revisiting of a particular 
historical period, her work is an attempt of 
problematizing beliefs of unambiguous 
ideological divisions. One can see the value of 
these methodological and epistemic approaches 
also as basis for the study of other 
circumstances of conflict beyond the case of 
Japan where specific episodes of discord or 
historical disputes seem to lead to factionalism, 
when in fact, these partitions evolve in a 
graded scale of grays. The author accomplishes 
her ambitious objectives but with varying 
degrees of success. 
 Linkhoeva divides Revolution Goes 
East into two parts using a mix of 
chronological and thematic criteria. In the first 
part, the author describes Japan’s domestic 
policy-making on how to react to the new 
Soviet state and to leftwing political 
representation. It builds up the foundations and 
defines the arduous trek towards diplomatic 
recognition with the Soviet Union. Chapter 1 
illustrates the relationship between Japan and 
Russia from their earlier contacts in the eighth 
century up until 1917. Linkhoeva explains how 
Japan saw Russia less as a direct military threat 
to its national integrity and more as a 
continuous menace to regional balance. This 
tension, as the author tracks down, has been at 
the core of their interactions since the 
eighteenth century: from disputes over the 
Kuril Islands (still mostly unresolved), the 
influence over the Korean peninsula, fishing 
and mining concessions, and the development 
of key infrastructures in Siberia. Despite the 
stormy relationship between these two 
neighbors, Linkhoeva points out that, in the 
end, pragmatism and an unavoidable need to 
cooperate and bear with each other trumped a 
real escalation of hostilities. Even after open 
war broke out between the two, as it happened 
between 1903 and 1905, a spirit of practical 
collaboration guided their actions. Japan did 
not want to humiliate Russia after their defeat. 
Instead, the peace agreements of 1907 had in 
mind the strengthening of Russia’s position in 
the region to forestall the US advance on 
Pacific matters. The author will later refer to 
these arguments to explain how despite the 
difficulties, the zealous disposition of Japan’s 
army, and the recent precedent of open conflict, 
the rapprochement between the Soviet Union 
and Japan during the 1920s was part of a 
historical trend. Linkhoeva strengthens her 
arguments by adding an overview of Japan’s 
cultural interest in Russian literature, a point 
that, unfortunately, is not developed in more 
detail further down the book. 
 Chapter 2 focuses more profusely on 
Japan’s official reaction to the 1917 Russian 
Revolution, their military involvement during 
the so-called Russian Civil War as the only 
foreign power to do so, up until their falling 
back from the country in 1922. The author 
refers to an abundant reservoir of Japanese 
off ic ial records to reconstruct these 
movements, the debates within Japanese elites, 
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and the rationale behind their decisions. She 
tells readers how Japanese media’s animosity 
towards the Bolsheviks in the early years 
facilitated a military intervention, although this 
resolve was not free from opposition from 
inside the government. Among other 
noteworthy episodes included in this chapter, 
Linkhoeva recounts Japan’s lobbying during 
the 1919 Paris Conference for the creation of a 
Siberian Republic. Japan tried to convince 
other Western powers that it was imperative to 
stop the expansion of communism to the East. 
This projected buffer state would be led by 
Aleksandr Kolchak, one of the leaders of the 
White Army, who, in turn, promised Japan 
generous concessions and debts. This 
experience is illustrative of the main array of 
arguments employed by the Japanese state 
when justifying their foreign policies towards 
Russia and later the Soviet Union: self-defense, 
retaliation, and regional safe-keeping. 
 Chapter 3 follows the development of 
the negotiations that led to the rapprochement 
between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1925. 
Linkhoeva argues that mutual diplomatic 
recognition was possible because Japanese and 
Soviet officials attempted to separate (not 
always with success and not without 
consequences) ideology from diplomacy: the 
Comintern’s desires for international revolution 
from the Soviet government’s agenda of 
ensuring their grasp of domestic power and 
stabilizing the country. The distance between 
the Comintern and the Soviet Union grew after 
the death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin, who 
was received among Japanese officials as a 
more conciliatory and germane leader than 
Trotsky. The author identifies the evolution of 
pan-Asianist thought in a sector of Japanese 
intellectuals as contributing to a climate of 
acceptance of this recognition, although the 
rapprochement ended up dividing this 
movement. The reasons behind this separation 
were at the kernel of the central disputes 
h a p p e n i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1 9 2 0 s : 
internationalism vs. nationalism. Linkhoeva 
proves how conservative principles prevailed 
and even gobbled up many in the Left by 
equating the needs of Japan to the agenda of 
the empire. 
In Chapter 4, the author describes how 
worsening domestic conditions fertilized the 
field for the flowering and nurturing of 
communism in Japan, which led conservative 
forces to cry their fears while the government 
worked with the Soviet Union. This is one of 
the most excitingly complex chapters of the 
book. Linkhoeva traces different strains of anti-
c o m m u n i s m b e y o n d c o n s e r v a t i v e s , 
traditionalists, and far-right militant groups. 
She talks, for instance, about how Japanese 
liberals sought to dwarf communist beliefs by 
betting on the construction of a so-called 
‘society of rights’ that would preserve the 
imperial state nonetheless. This zeal of 
confrontation paved the way for the passing of 
laws that ironically restrained civil rights. In 
1922, Japan’s legislative chamber issued the 
anti-leftist propaganda bill, which, after much 
debate, was reshaped to target only left-wing 
thought that was perceived to come from 
abroad. Linkhoeva argues that this bill created 
a binary conception that classified leftist 
ideologies essentially as a foreign threat, a 
logic with long-lasting consequences. But the 
most defining peace of legislation approved at 
the time was the Peace Preservation Law of 
1925. It imposed penalties to those who 
harbored an intention to alter the national 
polity, the kokutai, of up to 10 years of prison. 
The vague wording of ‘altering the kokutai’ 
was used to avoid limiting the effects to 
specific ideologies like ‘communism’ or 
‘anarchism’ and make it as broad as possible 
for their uses. In this chapter, the author offers 
a more complete view of the rise of the police 
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state in Japan: although unwillingly, liberal 
forces in Taishō Japan put so many efforts in 
distancing themselves from communism and 
socialism that they embraced and legitimated 
the nationalist-driven framework defended by 
conservatives.  
The second part of the book is devoted to 
disentangling the evolution of different strands 
of socialism in Japan after 1917 and how their 
infighting contributed to their eventual demise. 
Chapter 5 tackles the always complex 
re la t ionsh ip be tween anarch ism and 
communism during the 1920s. Anarchism had 
a longer and more grounded presence in Japan 
than communism, which really only took off 
after the Russian Revolution. Anarchism, 
although not lacking from intellectual backing 
(particularly among writers and other artists), 
was more focused on direct action. The failed 
attempt of assassination of the emperor in 1911 
led many anarchists to go underground but also 
facilitated their rise to popularity. By following 
the lives of Ōsugi Sakae and Takao Heibe, 
Linkhoeva shows how closely related 
anarchists and communists were in the first 
years of the 1920s and how they eventually 
drifted away, ridden by conflicts. While 
Linkhoeva does not shy from describing the 
animosity between these two groups, I 
appreciate the efforts to depict a more nuanced 
relationship than what has been commonly 
portrayed. Cooperation was more common 
than disagreement between anarchists and 
Bolsheviks, especially when it came to 
working together in the promotion and defense 
of labor unions. In the end, at the core of their 
disputes we find once more the conflict 
between international or national action, the 
tune that keeps repeating itself over and over 
again. 
 Chapter 6 follows the birth of the 
Japanese Communist Party in 1922 as a branch 
of the Comintern and their growth into an 
autonomous player that, despite common 
belief, acted independently from and even 
against the Comintern’s directions. The 
evolution of the JCP came together with the 
realization that the model of the Russian 
Revolution could not be exported without 
changes to Japan, as the Soviet Union and the 
Comintern at the time thought possible. 
Instead, for a revolution to happen, the JCP 
was convinced they needed to develop a 
national, ‘Japanese’ model of seizing power 
and mobilizing the masses. Riddled by debates 
over whether their main enemy was the 
bourgeoisie or the old feudal structures, 
whether to push for mass-mobilization or 
worker-led action, whether to act together with 
other Asian parties or alone, the original JCP 
suffered an unsurprisingly internal meltdown. 
Yamakawa Hitoshi, one of its founders and 
main figures and defendant of a Japanese 
model of revolution, was expelled along with 
his followers. In the 1930s, the JCP grew more 
close to the Comintern and their idea of 
international revolution. At the same time, 
Yamakawa got ironically vindicated when the 
Chinese Communist Party proved a successful 
revolution different than the Russian model 
was indeed possible. 
 In Chapter 7, Linkhoeva discusses the 
more controversial but highly influential 
National Socialism movement in Japan. 
Takabatake Motoyuki serves in this case as the 
main figure whose thought and action shaped 
the ideas of this movement that reinterpreted 
socialism as a means to reinforce the nation, 
the elites, and the state rather than the working 
class. Takabatake and the national socialists’ 
admiration of the Russian Revolution was 
paradoxically coupled with fierce anti-
communism and anti-Sovietism, which 
justified and later legitimated Japan’s imperial 
push abroad. As Linkhoeva suggests, national 
socialists’ fierce vindication of a single 
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political force eventually led to the elimination 
of competition (both to the Left and to the 
Right). It deepened the divide between left-
wing socialists on how to fit the nation in their 
plans and strategy, a conflict that I identify is 
still unresolved, not only for the Japanese Left 
but for many progressive parties across the 
world. In her conclusions, the author makes a 
brief incursion to events developing in the 
1930s. As these are outside of the declared 
scope of the book, this part falls a bit flat and 
undeservingly incomplete. It is always hard to 
give an end to historical pieces such as the one 
developed by Linkhoeva without showing too 
much the partial arbitrariness of chronological 
divisions. In this section, however, she makes a 
useful recap of the different strands of anti-
communist thought (liberal-conservatives and 
the warmongering army) that shaped Japan’s 
foreign policy in the years leading up to the 
invasion of China. 
 All in all, this is a fresh and well-argued 
book, rich in primary and secondary sources, 
which tackles a complex topic with confidence. 
There are two criticisms regarding structure 
and style that I dare point out, although none of 
them affects the quality of Linkhoeva’s 
contributions. The first has to do with the slight 
unbalance between sections. Some episodes in 
this book are harder to parse and too data-
chocked with statements, dates, and perhaps a 
more classical author-based style to history. 
The majority of the book is, however, more 
narrative-driven, providing a brisk and 
entertaining reading that does not compromise 
in depth. The second criticism – or maybe I 
should better say comment – is that I missed a 
bit more of signposting to what would happen 
in the 1930s. I understand and respect the 
author’s decision to focus on the 1920s as 
opposed to the more researched 1930s, but her 
approach seems to reveal nonetheless that 
many of these debates and actions were 
preparing the stage for the more dramatic 
scenario that would follow after Japan’s 
removal from the League of Nations in 1933.  
This book opens up many possibilities 
for the discussion of how a single historical 
event – in this case, the Russian Revolution – 
can influence intellectual and institutional 
action across a broad political spectrum. This 
circumstance of interpretative ambiguity needs 
to be a constant remainder when discussing 
matters of peace and conflicts. Historical 
events do not belong to particular factions or 
intellectual traditions. We must approach their 
influence from a standpoint of openness to 
their potential hermeneutic possibilities in 
becoming source and reference even for 
antagonic positions. These have, in turn, 
several echoes along the decades. Linkhoeva’s 
work shows an effort to expose Japan’s interest 
in Eastern Siberia and the Mongolian region. 
Hence, a potentially attractive book for readers 
who want more details on how this dangerous 
dream got partially materialized with the 
creation of the puppet-state of Manchukuo is 
Japan’s Total Empire, by Louise Young. Those 
readers interested in seeing the development of 
Left-wing (and Right-wing) factionalism after 
World War II can refer to William Andrew’s 
Dissenting Japan; and those who want a 
glimpse of how the hundred-anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution was celebrated in Japan 
can check out Heather Bowen-Struyk and 
Norma Field’s ““Art as a Weapon”: Japanese 
Proletarian Literature on the Centenary of the 
1917 Russian Revolution.”  
As a concluding remark, I want to defend 
that any work that confronts ideas of easily 
identifiable partisan positions as hegemonic 
and uncontested, just as Revolution Goes East 
attempts to do, is more than welcome in our 
day and age. If that book also denounces 
p r e v i o u s a t t e m p t s o f s h o e h o r n i n g 
unproblematized cultural particularism as the 
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main reason why these ideas seem to ‘not fit’ in 
Japan, then it is not only welcome, but 
definitely meritorious of our attention.  
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